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8. Asymmetric Federalism in Russia: 
Cure or Poison? 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez 
The Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 for several fundamental reasons, 
including the failure of planned socialism to improve people's standard of liv­
ing. One less anticipated, but also fundamental, reason for the disintegration 
of the Soviet state was the diversity and pluralism of the Soviet republics, 
which included countries as diverse as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 
Baltics; republics such as Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic in 
Central Asia; and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus. To the 
surprise of many, one of the leading supporters of this separation was the Rus­
sian Federation that, until then, had been perceived as the ruling centre of a 
vast empire put together during many centuries of war by czarist Russia and 
the Soviets. 
The birth of the Russian Federation in the agony of the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union marked the young country from the start with a fear of its 
own disintegration. The fears were justified: the Russian Federation was 
formed of 89 very different regions. From the start, several of these regions 
rushed to declare their sovereignty and independence from the Russian Feder­
ation. In many ways, therefore, the new country was subject to centrifugal 
forces similar to those that had led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
Nation building, indeed, keeping the nation together, took first priority in 
the national agenda in the early years of the transition (1992-93). One of the 
most important tools used in this effort was the design of a new system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations between the federal and regional govern­
ments and, to a lesser extent, between regional and local governments, capa­
ble of accommodating the diversity of Russian regions and ethnic groups. The 
new Russian government theoretically had the choice of building a homoge­
neous system of intergovernmental fiscal relations that treated all regions 
exactly the same or an asymmetric system, which would have given advan­
tages to some regions over others. 
In reality, in 1992-93 the federal government did not have much of a 
choice but to accept an asymmetric system of intergovernmental relations, 
which was rapidly being shaped by the demands of a small number of ethnic 
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republics. Indeed, it was the regions that early on dictated the agenda of the 
federal contract, that is, the shape and form the Russian Federation should 
assume. During the early years of the transition, the federal government 
remained reactive and tried to adapt to the agenda set by the maverick 
regions. The 1993 Russian constitution recognized the possibility of an asym­
metric configuration of intergovernmental relations between the regions and 
the federal government. 
In the eyes of many, the asymmetric design of the system of intergovern­
mental fiscal relations saved Russia from falling into an abyss of civil wars as 
in Chechnya, and thus kept the country from disintegrating. However, asym­
metric federalism has not been without its costs. A number of observers have 
explained many of the problems and tribulations Russia has faced in the last 
decade—lack of fiscal discipline, economic stagnation and so on—as having 
roots in asymmetric federalism and the federal government's inability to 
enforce federal laws throughout the Russian Federation. In 1997-98, the 
administration of President Boris Yeltsin started a campaign to rein in the 
regions. This policy was significantly increased by the new administration of 
President Vladimir Putin, who, since he took over in 2000, has made gaining 
control over the regions and enforcing federal laws a cornerstone of his 
administration. 
The trademark of the early years of the Yeltsin administration was to 
accommodate the demands for more autonomy with concessions to the most 
aggressive regions that basically gave them more favourable treatment within 
the framework of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Leaving aside the issue 
of Chechnya, this special treatment did not succeed in quieting those 
demands. Part of the problem was self-inflicted, in that early on, Yeltsin saw 
the regional demands as a strategic weapon that he could use in his fight for 
political dominance with the legislative branch, the Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin 
eventually prevailed over parliament, but things got too far away from Yeltsin 
for him to reclaim control over the powerful and now democratically elected 
governors he had created. During the Yeltsin years, many regions behaved as 
if they saw little benefit from being part of the federation and acted prepon­
derantly with a narrow, selfish view and not in the national interest. This sce­
nario changed radically with Putin's election as president in March 2000. 
Putin was elected with a wide margin and his popularity allowed him to 
immediately take on the regional governors and reduce their power. 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the role, significance and 
effects of asymmetric federalism in the Russian Federation to draw a number 
of useful lessons in relation to those things that have worked and others that 
have not. The organization of fiscal federalism in Russia continues to evolve. 
Where President Putin and his administration actually want to take fiscal 
federalism is uncertain, but more central control from Moscow and a 
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strengthened state appear to be high on the policy agenda. This does not nec­
essarily mean that sustained fiscal recentralization will occur. However, the 
most recent changes in 2004 following the Beslan school hostage crisis in 
southern Russia signal a further swing toward centralization in the country. 
The most significant of these changes is President Putin's call for the elimi­
nation of democratic elections for regional governors and having them 
directly appointed from Moscow. 
The next section describes the significant economic, geographic and ethnic 
diversity of Russia's regions in some detail. This is followed by a discussion 
of the principles and theory of asymmetric federalism. The next section 
reviews the nature and extent of asymmetric federalism in Russia (I do not 
discuss in any depth the conflict in Chechnya; for this see Lapidus 1998). The 
chapter then examines how well the asymmetric design of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations has worked before turning to a discussion of the future of fis­
cal decentralization in Russia and what role asymmetric policies are expected 
to play. 
REGIONAL DIVERSITY 
Russia is the largest country in the world, spanning 11 time zones and 17 mil­
lion square kilometres (see Figure 8.1 for a map of Russia). It encompasses 89 
regional autonomous governments (grouped into 11 areas for statistical pur­
poses) with a total population of 145.9 million in 2000. Russia's regions are 
diverse in terms of economic conditions, ethnic composition, language and 
religious and historical differences. The 1993 constitution states that of the 89 
'subjects of the federation', which I will refer to as regions, 21 are republics, 
made up of the former autonomous republics and most of the autonomous 
oblasts in the former Soviet Union; 55 are regular Russian oblasts and krays; 
2 are the city regions of Moscow, the capital, and St Petersburg, the capital 
from the time of Peter the Great until the Soviet era; and 11 are autonomous 
okrugs (AOs), including the Jewish autonomous oblast.1 Even though the 
Russian Federation theoretically consists of 89 regions, because of the on­
going civil war in one of its regions, Chechnya, statistics and reports often 
refer to only 88 regions. 
Many of the ethnic republics tend to be quite poor and are often located on 
the periphery of the country, with higher transportation costs to main markets 
and alienation from the country's mainstream. This group includes the 
republics of Tuva, Buryatia, Karelia, Chechnya and Dagestan. At the same 
time, several ethnic republics are rich in natural resources and have been at 
the vanguard of demands for autonomy and separatist threats. This group 
includes Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha (Yakutia). 
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Main Regional Features 
Table 8.1 presents the main features of the regions for the 11 geographical 
areas, and the appendix shows the feature for all 89 regions. The most striking 
feature is the unevenness of the distribution of land and population. For 
example, the East Siberia Area and the Far Eastern Area combined represent 
more than 60 per cent of the territory of the country but barely over 11 per 
cent of the population. By contrast, the Central Area, which includes Moscow, 
represents 2.8 per cent of the area of the country but 20 per cent of the popu­
lation. In terms of population density, it is less than 0.1 person per square 
kilometre in Taimyrsky AO in East Siberia and 8631 people per square kilo­
metre in Moscow. 
The regions also differ in the vertical structure of government. The bud­
getary system across regions is quite diverse, with regions having three to five 
levels of government, but not all of them with a separate budget (Kurlyand-
skaya 2001). In some regions, the regional authorities have a two-tier govern­
ment structure. This typically happens in regions where municipalities are 
subordinated to rayon (county) governments. This second tier of regional 
government typically has a purely executive function and the authorities are 
appointed by the regional centre, which is, however, assigned its own operat­
ing budget. 
Demographic Changes 
During the last decade of economic transition, Russia has lost population. The 
country's population stood at 148.7 million in 1992, but was down to 145.9 
million in 2000 (Table 8.2). Most regions suffered population losses from 
1991 to 1999 that were as high as 6.6 per cent in the Central Area, which 
includes Moscow. The notable exceptions were several ethnic republics and 
AOs that experienced natural increases in population during the period, for 
example, Dagestan, Chukotskiy AO, Ingushetiya and Yamalo Neteskiy AO. 
Those experiencing the largest negative natural changes in population were 
the regions in the corridor between Moscow and St. Petersburg (Tver, Nov­
gorod, Pkov and Leningrad oblasts). 
The areas have varied much more widely in terms of changes in population 
caused by net migration. The two main migration processes during the transi­
tion years were the return of Russians from other former Soviet republics and 
out-migration from the more inhospitable regions in the north and far east to 
the western and southern parts of Russia (Heleniak 1997). The big losers were 
the Far Eastern Area, which lost 10.7 per cent of its population in 1991-99, 
and the Northern Area, which lost 5.1 per cent (Table 8.3). These area aver­
ages conceal some dramatic differences within the areas. For example, in the 
Table 8.1 Key features of areas, selected years 
Population GRP 
Area, Population, density, GRP, per capita, 
2000 2000 2000 1998 1998 Percent­ Percent­ Percent­
(thousands (thousands (people (Rub (Rub age of age of age of 
Name of area of km2) of people) per km2) thousands) thousands) area population GDP 
Northern Area 1466.3 5668 3.9 110 383 19.1 8.59 3.88 4.59 
Northwestern Area 197.1 7898 40.1 126 866 15.9 1.15 5.41 5.28 
Central Area 484.0 29 361 60.7 615 670 20.8 2.83 20.12 25.63 
Volgo-Vyatsk Area 265.4 8292 31.2 97 686 11.7 1.55 5.68 4.07 
Central Chernozem Area 167.7 7781 46.4 87 858 11.2 0.98 5.33 3.66 
Povolzhsk Area 536.4 16 805 31.3 240 021 14.2 3.14 11.52 9.99 
North Caucasian Area 374.4 17 677 47.2 148 653 8.4 2.19 12.11 6.19 
Ural Area 824.0 20 321 24.7 306 038 15.0 4.83 13.93 12.74 
West Siberia Area 2427.2 15 040 6.2 356 823 23.6 14.21 10.31 14.85 
East Siberia Area 4122.8 8973 2.2 158 566 17.5 24.14 6.15 6.60 
Far Eastern Area 6231.0 7160 1.1 153 717 21.0 36.49 4.91 6.40 
Russian Federation 17 075.4 145 925 8.5 2 402 280 16.3 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Maximum 3103.2 8631 8 631.0 362 520 62.7 18.17 5.91 15.09 
Minimum 0.6 18 0.0 1053 3.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GDP Gross domesitc product. 
GRP Gross regional product. 
Source: Goskomstat data. 
Table 8.2 Population by area, selected years 
1986 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per-
Number centage Number centage Number centage Number centage Number centage Number centage 
Area (thousands) share (thousands) share (thousands) share (thousands) share (thousands) share (thousands) share 
Northern Area 5959 4.1 6136 4.1 6023 4.1 5889 4.0 5785 3.9 5668 3.9 
Northwestern Area 8091 5.6 8270 5.6 8136 5.5 8052 5.4 7989 5.4 7898 5.4 
Central Area 29 821 20.7 30 363 20.4 30 099 20.3 29 883 20.2 29 651 20.2 29 361 20.1 
Volgo-Vyatsk Area 8372 5.8 8503 5.7 8483 5.7 8444 5.7 8376 5.7 8292 5.7 
Central Chernozem Area 7702 5.4 7762 5.2 7840 5.3 7880 5.3 7846 5.3 7781 5.3 
Povolzhsk Area 16 035 11.1 16 641 11.2 16 808 11.3 16 920 11.4 16 886 11.5 16 805 11.5 
North Caucasian Area 16 347 11.4 17 246 11.6 17518 11.8 17 738 12.0 17 707 12.0 17 677 12.1 
Ural Area 19 882 13.8 20 475 13.8 20 465 13.8 20 461 13.8 20 406 13.9 20 321 13.9 
West Siberia Area 14 364 10.0 15 122 10.2 15 093 10.2 15 128 10.2 15 109 10.3 15 040 10.3 
East Siberia Area 8834 6.1 9260 6.2 9200 6.2 9144 6.2 9071 6.2 8973 6.1 
Far Eastern Area 7581 5.3 8032 5.4 7788 5.2 7505 5.1 7336 5.0 7160 4.9 
Russian Federation 143 835 100.0 148 704 100.0 148 366 100.0 147 976 100.0 147 105 100.0 145 925 100.0 
Maximum 8740 6.1 8957 6.0 8793 5.9 8664 5.9 8629 5.9 8631 5.9 
Minimum 21 0.0 25 0.0 23 0.0 20 0.0 20 0.0 18 0.0 
Source: Census data reported by Goskomstat. 
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Table 8.3 Net changes in population by area, 1991-99 
(per cent) 
Area Natural changes 
Change from 
migration 
Northern Area -1.9 -5.1 
Northwestern Area -6.7 2.5 
Central Area -6.6 3.6 
Volgo-Vyatsk Area -4.3 2.5 
Central Chernozem Area -6.0 6.8 
Povolzhsk Area -3.0 4.6 
North Caucasian Area -0.7 4.7 
Ural Area -2.6 2.3 
West Siberia Area -1.8 1.8 
East Siberia Area -0.4 -1.8 
Far Eastern Area 0.7 -10.7 
Russian Federation -3.3 2.1 
Source: Author's computation based on Goskomstat data. 
Far Eastern Area, the Chuotsky AO lost more than half of its population and 
Magadan oblast lost 40 per cent. These are remote, isolated areas with harsh 
living conditions that lost strategic military value with the end of the Cold 
War.2 Another big loser in net migration was Chechnya because of its seces­
sionist war. 
The big winners in net migration were warmer and more hospitable parts 
of the country, such as the Central Cherzozem (Black Soil) Area, with the 
population of Belgorod oblast, for example, increasing by 11.8 per cent, and 
the North Caucasian Area, with the population of Krasnodar kray increasing 
by 11.4 per cent. Kaliningrad oblast, a western enclave in the Baltic Sea 
between Poland and Lithuania, was also a big winner in net migration, up 
10.8 per cent in 1991-99. 
An interesting observation is that Moscow, by far the richest and most 
attractive destination in economic terms, did not experience much net migra­
tion: 2.2 per cent during 1991-99. This may have been due to Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov's illegal demands that would-be residents apply for residency per­
mits,3 but also by the scarcity and high cost of housing. In St. Petersburg, 
where there has been no highly publicized enforcement of residency permits, 
but where the cost of housing is high and which experienced much less eco­
nomic growth than Moscow, net migration was a negative 0.1 per cent. Note 
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that the oblasts surrounding the two cities, Leningrad oblast and Moscow 
oblast, experienced much higher net migration during the period, 8.3 per cent 
and 4.3 per cent, respectively. 
Ethnic Diversity and Relative Geographic Remoteness 
The Russian Federation has significant ethnic diversity, but much less than in 
the former Soviet Union. Lapidus (1999, p. 75) describes the 21 ethnically 
defined republics of the Russia Federation as 'islands in an ethnically Russian 
sea.' As Table 8.4 indicates, in 1989, 88 per cent of the country's population 
was ethnic Russian. The ethnic nationalities tend to be concentrated along the 
periphery of the country, such as the North Caucasian Area, but even here some 
three-quarters of the population are ethnic Russians. However, in 11 regions, 
ethnic nationalities account for more than half the population. These are the 
Chuvasia republic, the Kalmikya republic, the Tatarstan republic, the Dagestan 
republic, the Ingushetiya republic (which includes Chechnya), the Kabardino-
Balkaria republic, the Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya republic, the North Osetia 
Table 8.4 Shares of Russian and other populations by area, 1989 
(per cent) 
Area Russian 
Main ethnic 
group 
Other ethnic 
groups3 
Northern Area 89.5 6.2 4.2 
Northwestern Area 97.6 0.0 2.4 
Central Area 98.4 0.0 1.6 
Volgo-Vyatsk Area 79.2 18.7 2.0 
Central Chernozem Area 97.4 0.0 2.6 
Povolzhsk Area 78.9 16.9 4.2 
North Caucasian Area 76.1 22.6 1.3 
Ural Area 83.0 10.8 5.4 
West Siberia Area 95.1 1.0 4.0 
East Siberia Area 86.3 8.0 5.7 
Far Eastern Area 85.5 4.9 9.7 
Russian Federation 88.3 8.0 3.6 
Maximum 100.0 80.2 28.4 
Minimum 19.8 0.0 0.0 
a. Others may include Ukrainians, Belorussians, Tatars, Armenians, Germans, Jews and other 
nationalities that are not Russians and not part of the main ethnic group. 
Source: Census data reported by Goskomstat. 
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republic, Komi-Permyatskaya AO, the Tuva republic and Aginskiy Buryatskiy 
AO. In some of these regions 'titular' nationals (or the main ethnic group) con­
stitute a majority of the population. In addition to titular nationals, Goskom-
stat, the statistical office, also records other nationalities, such as Ukrainians, 
Belorussians, Armenians, Tatars and Jews. Even though these groups consti­
tute minorities in the country as a whole, the various ethnic groups are concen­
trated enough in a number of regions to make ethnic demands an important 
issue in the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations.4 
Another significant factor of diversity, and possibly of conflict and frustra­
tion between the regions and the centre, involves time zones and geographical 
distance between the federal capital and the regions. Because Russia has 11 
time zones, many regions are unable to communicate with Moscow during 
regular working hours. The average distance between the capitals of the 
regions in the Far Eastern Area and Moscow is 9355 kilometres and the aver­
age time difference is eight hours. The average distance between regional cap­
itals and Moscow for the entire Russian Federation is 2633 kilometres and the 
average time difference is two hours. 
Economic Disparities 
Russia's regions are significantly disparate in industrial development and nat­
ural resource endowments. This has led to extremely high differences in gross 
regional product (GRP) per capita across the regions. In 1998, the difference 
between the region with the highest GRP per capita (Tyumen oblast, which 
has the largest deposits of oil and gas in Russia) and that with the lowest 
(Ingushetia republic) was 18-fold, with areas' ratios to the mean GRP per 
capita for Russia ranging from 3.8 to 0.2 (Table 8.5). The area averages for 
GRP per capita shown in the table hide some large disparities. For example, 
regions with high GRP per capita are Moscow and the republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia) in Siberia, which is rich in mineral deposits, while extremely poor 
regions include the Dagestan republic and other peripheral ethnic republics. 
The transition period has done little to erase disparities, and if anything, 
economic disparities have become worse (see Sutherland and Hanson 1996 
for a discussion of growing economic disparities in the early years of the tran­
sition). As Table 8.6 shows, the ratio between the maximum and minimum 
values for regional personal income per capita, themselves expressed as ratios 
to the overall mean for Russia, increased from 3.8 in 1985 to 18.5 in 1999, an 
almost 500 per cent increase. This trend has added to the challenge of design­
ing the right system of intergovernmental fiscal relations, especially the sys­
tem of equalization transfers. 
Economic disparities are aggravated by significant differences in the cost 
of living across the regions, for instance, in 1999, the cost of the minimum 
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Table 8.5 GRP per capita by area, 1998 
Area 
GRP per capita 
(current Rub) 
Ratio to the mean 
for Russia 
Northern Area 19 081 1.17 
Northwestern Area 15 880 0.97 
Central Area 20 764 1.27 
Volgo-Vyatsk Area 11 663 0.71 
Central Chernozem Area 11 198 0.69 
Povolzhsk Area 14 214 0.87 
North Caucasian Area 8395 0.51 
Ural Area 14 997 0.92 
West Siberia Area 23 617 1.45 
East Siberia Area 17 481 1.07 
Far Eastern Area 20 954 1.28 
Russian Federation 16 330 1.00 
Maximum 62 661 3.80 
Minimum 3365 0.20 
Source: Author's computation based on Goskomstat data. 
Table 8.6 Personal income per capita by area, selected years 
(ratio to the mean for Russia) 
Area 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Northern Area 1.19 1.12 1.17 1.04 
Northwestern Area 1.04 1.06 1.07 0.93 
Central Area 1.07 1.12 1.54 1.74 
Volgo-Vyatsk Area 0.92 0.88 0.67 0.58 
Central Chernozem Area 0.90 0.87 0.67 0.66 
Povolzhsk Area 0.92 0.91 0.71 0.75 
North Caucasian Area 0.77 0.81 0.57 0.61 
Ural Area 0.92 0.91 0.78 0.78 
West Siberia Area 1.10 1.10 1.15 1.12 
East Siberia Area 0.98 0.94 1.01 0.87 
Far Eastern Area 1.30 1.28 1.24 1.07 
Russian Federation 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 2.18 2.12 3.50 4.26 
Minimum 0.57 0.60 0.23 0.23 
Source: Author's computation based on Goskomstat data. 
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regional subsistence basket was 470 per cent higher in Chukotskiy AO than in 
Ulyanov oblast. The most expensive regions are in the Far Eastern Area and 
the least expensive are in the Povolzhsk area. 
The disparities have arisen primarily because economic growth has 
increasingly been concentrated in a handful of regions and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has been concentrated in an even smaller number of 
regions. Some areas that in the past depended more heavily than others on 
Moscow for transfers and subsidies, such as the Far Eastern and Northern 
areas, have suffered disproportionately from budget cuts and from the end of 
the Cold War era and the subsequent closing of many military facilities. In 
addition, changes in revenue sharing arrangements between the centre and the 
regions have allowed more income to stay in the resource-rich regions. 
With the exception of growth of 0.5 per cent in 1997, the growth rate for 
Russia as a whole was negative during 1995-98, though it has improved in 
recent years. Area average growth rates followed much the same pattern, 
ranging from growth of 1.9 per cent in the Northern Area in 1998 to -14.5 per 
cent in the West Siberia Area that same year despite significant positive 
growth in 1995 and 1996. The largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, did 
well in terms of growth during this period, especially Moscow. Their sur­
rounding oblasts did less well. Natural resource-rich regions like Tyumen 
oblast experienced ups and downs in real GRP depending on oil prices. Other 
regions experienced what seem to be extremely large fluctuations in real GRP, 
but whether these represent reporting anomalies or not is unclear. 
Ahrend (2000) investigates a number of possible factors that could help 
explain the difference in economic performance across the regions during the 
transition years. He finds that the most robust explanatory variable is the ini­
tial competitiveness of a region's industry, measured as the share of exports in 
total regional output. Other important factors in explaining performance were 
industrial structure, natural resource endowment and human capital. What is 
most controversial in Ahrend's findings is that political, institutional and 
reform variables did not seem to matter in explaining different growth rates 
across regions. Despite the wide belief that the degree to which a region 
implemented economic reform measures should have played an important 
role in explaining economic performance, Ahrend (2000) finds that initial 
conditions at the start of the transition played a much more important role. 
Similarly, de Melo, Ofer and Yossifov (1999) find that economic performance 
of the regional capitals along the Volga River was associated with favourable 
initial conditions; however, they also give economic reform an important role 
in explaining differences in performance. 
One possibility is that the impact of economic reforms on economic 
growth works with a lag and therefore takes some time to be detected statisti­
cally. Another possibility is that positive initial conditions tend to be posi­
tively correlated with economic reform, and therefore disentangling the two 
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types of effects is hard. At any rate, with few constraints on their lawmaking 
powers, the regions have come up with quite different legal and regulatory 
regimes (Polishchuck 2000). These differences in economic and regulatory 
regimes are to a large extent manifestations of regional preferences and the 
autonomy the constitution provides to the regions. The starkest difference has 
been between a group of regions that have maintained intensive interventions 
in the economy through price controls, hurdles to interregional trade and the 
use of consumer subsidies, the so-called red belt regions, and many other 
regions that have followed liberal and more market-friendly policies.5 
Foreign Direct Investment Patterns 
To date the opening of the economy to foreign investors has done little to 
reduce economic disparities across the regions. Indeed, FDI appears to have 
contributed to the widening disparities. 
Clearly Moscow has benefited from being the political capital of the coun­
try and is by far the most attractive destination for FDI. During 1995-99, the 
city of Moscow accounted for 44.1 per cent of Russia's total FDI and 
Moscow oblast, the regional ring around the city, came in second place 
among the regions, accounting for 9.8 per cent of total FCI. Together this rep­
resents more than half of all FDI in Russia, and according to Goskomstat, the 
trend seems to have continued in more recent years. By contrast, the city of 
Moscow and Moscow oblast together represent about 20 per cent of Russia's 
gross domestic product. Because it is the capital, some FDI that has been 
recorded as taking place in Moscow may actually have ended up elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, in addition to being the country's finance and communications 
centre, Moscow has built up a significant industrial and services base. 
The next most important destination for FDI has been St Petersburg and its 
surrounding region, Leningrad oblast. The two combined represented almost 
8 per cent of total FDI in 1995-99. FDI has also been significant in several 
other regions. In some cases, it is related to gas and/or oil projects, for exam­
ple, in Sakhalinsk oblast and in Krasnoyarsk kray, but in other cases invest­
ments have been more diversified, as in Novosibirsk oblast with investments 
by Coca-Cola and other food processing enterprises and in Samara oblast 
with investments by the chemical, food processing and petroleum refining 
industries. Broadman and Recanatini (2001) analyse the distribution of FDI 
and find that the most important determinants are market size, infrastructure 
development and policy environment factors. 
The Haves and the Have Nots 
Disparities in economic conditions have led to a political split at the regional 
level, with two main coalitions lobbying the federal authorities in quite different 
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directions. The first group consists of the rich or donor regions, that is, the 
regions that contribute in net terms to the federal budget. The second group 
consists of the poor or subsidized regions, that is, those that receive a net 
inflow of funds from the federal budget. The club of rich regions has had 
some mobility at the bottom, but permanent members include the city of 
Moscow, St Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Sverdlovsk, Volgograd, 
Tyumen, Khanty-Mansi, Krasnoyarsk and Sakha (Yakutia). 
Policies to Reduce Interregional Income Disparities 
This section highlights some of the main policies concerning revenue assign­
ments, federal expenditures and transfers that have had major impacts on 
regional disparities (see Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001 for more details). 
Revenue assignments have evolved significantly during the transition. At the 
start of the transition, and despite all the problems it represented in terms of 
bargaining and discretion, the practice of regulation (or adjusting tax sharing 
rates for individual regions in a discretionary manner) provided the federal 
authorities with the significant advantage of being able, at least in theory, to 
equalize fiscal disparities across regions by reducing the rates at which taxes 
are shared in richer regions and increasing them in poorer regions. The drive 
to improve predictability and transparency in revenue assignments meant that 
after 1994, the federal authorities attempted to keep sharing rates stable over 
time and to make them uniform across regions, with the implication that all 
regions, rich and poor, had to be treated the same. Table 8.7 summarizes rev­
enue assignments between the federal government and the regions during 
1991-2002. 
Thus the attainment of more efficient and transparent revenue assignments 
resulted in even larger fiscal disparities between the regions and the federal 
government had to rely on a new system of equalization grants to offset some 
of the increased disparities in the distribution of fiscal resources. Whereas rev­
enue sharing arrangements were relatively stable from 1994 through 1997, 
several substantial changes were made in revenue sharing arrangements before 
and after the economic crisis of August 1998. Changes in the assignment of 
revenues, especially the assignment of personal income tax collections, reflect 
a tug-of-war over resources between the federal and regional governments. As 
Table 8.7 shows, in recent years fiscal policy reforms have aimed at reassign­
ing tax revenues away from subnational governments and towards the federal 
government. The federal government's share of overall tax collections reached 
60 per cent in 2001, up from a low of 42.5 per cent in 1997. 
As noted earlier, a particularly important source of fiscal disparities is the 
extremely uneven distribution of natural resources, especially oil and natural 
gas. The significance of uneven distribution was emphasized by tax reforms 
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that, for the first time in Russia's history, gave the regions a significant share 
of the tax revenues from mineral resources beginning in 1992 and confirmed 
in the Tax Code in 2002. 
Actual revenues may also differ across regions because subnational gov­
ernments have been granted some degree of tax autonomy. This autonomy 
basically consists of the choice of tax rates up to a maximum rate for three 
taxes: the shared part of the enterprise profit tax, with different rates for finan­
cial institutions and other enterprises; the sales tax; and the enterprise assets 
tax.6 However, with just a few exceptions, regional governments are making 
full use of their ability to raise taxes by charging the highest allowable rates 
for those taxes. Nevertheless, their ability to self-finance their budgets out of 
own and shared taxes varies considerably, ranging from 1 per cent in Mada-
gasnk oblast to 100 per cent in the city of Moscow. 
In addition to tax policy, the federal government's expenditure policies in 
the regions can increase or dampen fiscal disparities. One way to look at this 
issue is to observe direct expenditures by the federal government in the 
regions, which are difficult to calculate and involve some arbitrary assump­
tions (Table 8.8). Setting aside the extremely large figure for federal direct 
expenditures per capita in the city of Moscow, which reflects the allocation 
there of 'unallocatable' items (such as a large share of national defence expen­
ditures, which cannot be easily identified with any particular area), the num­
bers in Table 8.8 tell two main stories. First, federal direct expenditures seem 
to help equalize fiscal disparities, because they are larger in poorer, remote 
areas in the Northern Area, the East Siberia Area and the Far Eastern Area. 
Second, though not shown in the table, is that those regional governments that 
by treaty or unilateral action tend to retain a higher portion of federal tax rev­
enues, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, do indeed account for the lowest 
federal direct expenditures per capita by a wide margin. 
The most important tool the federal government uses to address the prob­
lem of fiscal disparity is the system of intergovernmental equalization trans­
fers. This has been changing continuously during the transition as the formula 
used to allocate funds to the regions has continued to improve. After the 2000 
reforms, the system improved in terms of its transparency, objectivity and 
minimization of negative incentive effects on revenue mobilization and 
expenditure efficiency by using measures of revenue capacity and expendi­
ture needs to arrive at fiscal disparities. Table 8.9 shows total federal transfers 
by area for 1997-2000 and budgeted equalization transfers for 2001. As a per­
centage of the total, regions in the North Caucasian Area receive the largest 
amount of transfers, followed by regions in the Far Eastern Area. The Central 
Area is also an important recipient, as are West and East Siberia. 
In per capita terms, the rankings are somewhat different, with the regions 
in the Far Eastern Area and the North Caucasian Area being significantly 
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Table 8.8 Federal direct expenditures by area, 1998 
Federal Total federal 
direct direct 
expenditure expenditure 
Population per capita (Rub 
Area (thousands) (Rub) thousands) 
Northern Area 5785 526 3 043 922 
Northwestern Area 7989 500 3 998 013 
Central Area, of which 29 651 2057 60 988 759 
city of Moscow 8629 6074 52 412 546 
Volgo-Vyatsk Area 8376 280 2 342 736 
Central Chernozem Area 7846 315 2 474 648 
Povolzhsk Area 16 886 266 4 487 642 
North Caucasian Area 17 707 388 6 862 222 
Ural Area 20 406 260 5 299 156 
West Siberia Area 15 109 544 8 219 592 
East Siberia Area 9071 470 4 258 988 
Far Eastern Area 7336 727 5 334 204 
Russian Federation 147 105 731 107 605 984 
Maximum 8629 6074 52 412 546 
Minimum 20 43 20 826 
Source: Goskomstat data. 
ahead of the rest (Table 8.9). Note, however, that with some exceptions, fed­
eral transfers do not represent the largest share of areas' budgets,7 for exam­
ple, the share of transfers in the total revenues of the Far Eastern Area was 
11.8 per cent in 2000 (Table 8.10). This share varied significantly for individ­
ual regions, for instance, for the same year, transfers represented 78 per cent 
of total revenues for the Tuva Republic in the East Siberia Area. 
What Has Driven Federal Transfers to the Regions? 
Investigators have carried out a considerable amount of research on the politi­
cal economy and equity of federal transfers in Russia. The question most 
often asked has been whether the goal of federal transfers is to attain such 
economic objectives as the equalization of fiscal capacity and expenditure 
needs among different levels of governments, or whether they actually reflect 
political economy considerations and purely asymmetric treatment and are 
governed by the political forces of the moment. Popov (2002), Treisman 
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Table 8.10 Share of transfers in areas' total revenues, 1997-2000 
(percent) 
Area 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Northern Area 5.1 5.3 3.8 3.3 
Northwestern Area 5.9 3.2 2.9 0.7 
Central Area 4.8 2.9 3.1 12.2 
Volgo-Vyatsk Area 13.9 8.5 9.2 9.0 
Central Chernozem Area 10.6 6.7 8.1 7.6 
Povolzhsk Area 5.7 4.5 3.8 2.9 
North Caucasian Area 25.0 21.6 21.8 25.2 
Ural Area 3.4 2.5 1.8 2.2 
West Siberia Area 6.7 5.7 4.8 4.8 
East Siberia Area 10.0 10.0 8.4 9.3 
Far Eastern Area 21.3 18.7 13.4 11.8 
Russian Federation 8.4 6.6 6.2 6.3 
Maximum 66.0 100.0 75.0 96.2 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Goskomstat data. 
(1996, 2000) and others find that politics have been a major force in defining 
federal transfers to the regions, though the relevant political factors may have 
changed over time. For example, Treisman (1996) concludes that early on, the 
central government used federal transfers to appease troublemaking regions. 
Between 1992 and 1994, the regions that got treated most favourably were 
those that had not supported Yeltsin's government in the dispute with parlia­
ment and those that had made separatist noises through such actions as issu­
ing declarations of sovereignty. By contrast, during 1996-98, Popov (2002) 
and Speckhard (1998) find that the regions that got treated better in terms of 
federal transfers were those that had supported the Yeltsin government in the 
1995 parliamentary elections and the 1996 presidential elections.8 
However, other studies have emphasized that transfers have been roughly 
compatible with regions' fiscal needs, because the bulk of federal transfers 
has gone to the neediest regions, thereby partially accomplishing the desirable 
objective of equalization (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001; McAuley 1997; 
Stewart 1996). But as Solanko (1999) points out, whether politics or eco­
nomic and fiscal needs motivated transfers in the Yeltsin years may be hard to 
discern because of the correlation between poor socioeconomic conditions 
and the antireform and anti-Yeltsin sentiments among regions early on during 
the transition. 
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THE RATIONALE FOR ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM 
One of the ways the Russian Federation has managed to cope with such a 
high degree of diversity has been through the differential treatment of the 
regions, that is, the practice of asymmetric federalism. Russia is not alone in 
having adopted this approach. Many multinational democracies have done so 
(Stepan 1999).9 
Concepts 
Even though asymmetric federalism has become a commonly used term, its 
meaning is not always clear and several dimensions need to be considered. To 
begin with, one can distinguish between de jure asymmetric treatment as 
opposed to de facto asymmetric treatment. In the first case, decentralization 
laws treat some regions more advantageously, such as providing them with 
wider revenue powers than other regions. In the second case, the advantage 
comes from how laws are actually implemented, basically discriminating in 
favour of or against particular regions by, for example, channelling additional 
funds to some regions in an ad hoc or nontransparent manner. 
Another useful differentiation is between asymmetric treatment ex ante 
versus asymmetric treatment ex post. Asymmetric federalism implies the 
unequal treatment of regions ex ante, with regions having different powers 
and privileges for being what they are. Ex post most regions will almost cer­
tainly fair differently, because of the many other factors that affect outcomes 
in addition to the institutional policy framework provided by the central 
government. 
Asymmetric federalism can manifest itself in different aspects of decen­
tralization. For example, as concerns political decentralization, some regions 
may have more autonomy than others to legislate and use the trappings of 
nationhood. In relation to administrative decentralization, regions may have 
different powers to set salaries and fire and hire personnel. In the case of fis­
cal decentralization, regions may have different revenue and expenditure 
assignments.10 
Benefits 
Asymmetric federalism can be used to accommodate diverse and more or less 
permanent preferences and appetites for autonomy across regions. Often the 
different demands for autonomy are based on regions' particular history 
(McLure, Wallich and Litvack 1996). Asymmetric federalism can also be 
used to accommodate different regional administrative capabilities and state 
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of readiness for decentralized management (Garcia-Mila and McGuire, Chap­
ter 7 in this volume). In the case of Russia, asymmetric fiscal arrangements 
appear to have arisen more from political considerations than from efficiency 
considerations. By accommodating different desires for regional autonomy 
and political independence, asymmetric federalism fit the early demands for 
independence by a number of ethnic republics. While Russian regions have 
quite different administrative capabilities, this never seemed to be a driving 
force for asymmetric federalism. Asymmetric federalism has also been 
explained as a way to address conflicts of interest and growing divergence 
between richer regions with stronger economic bases and more incentives to 
resist interregional distributions and poorer regions that are highly dependent 
on central transfers (Freinkman and Haney 1997). Naturally regions with 
fewer resources are more inclined to oppose asymmetric decentralization 
because the asymmetry will likely protect the interests of the wealthier 
regions. This process has no doubt played a role in Russia. 
Stepan (1999) makes an interesting point from a cultural and linguistic per­
spective. He argues that some groups of individuals in a country may only be 
able to participate fully as individual citizens if they acquire particular rights 
as a group. For example, the rights to schooling, media access and freedom of 
religious practice correspond to the groups' rights to use its own language and 
culture, therefore these different needs and preferences give rise to asymmet­
ric treatment in democratic environments. Initial conditions matter in these 
interpretations. For example, is the right to use a regional language an exam­
ple of asymmetric treatment or is the prohibition against using a regional lan­
guage an example of asymmetric treatment? 
Costs 
Asymmetric federalism obviously offers some advantages, whether tempo­
rary or more permanent, but not without costs. One cost is philosophical, in 
the sense that asymmetry means an absence of equal rights across the coun­
try. For example, if the republic of Tatarstan is allowed to retain a higher 
share of revenues than other regions, its citizens may receive a higher level 
of public services than residents in other regions. Asymmetry also tends to 
diminish the central government's ability to pursue national objectives, such 
as revenue mobilization for the delivery of services at the national level, or 
its ability to implement equalization at the subnational level. The asymmetric 
treatment of regions is often associated with a lack of transparency and 
with complex administrative relationships. A good example is the secret 
bilateral treaties the Russian federal government struck with many regions in 
the mid-1990s. 
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THE PRACTICE OF ASYMMETRIC 
FEDERALISM IN RUSSIA 
Asymmetric federalism has played an important role in Russian federalism. 
From the start, asymmetric federalism played a crucial role in the struggle to 
keep the Russian Federation together. What followed were different manifes­
tations of asymmetric federalism, including customized bilateral treaties 
between the centre and the regions and an intense constitutional debate about 
the nature of the Russian Federation (Lynn and Novikov 1997). Fundamen­
tally, however, asymmetric federalism started for pragmatic reasons. De facto 
asymmetry arose simply from the fact that several regions were demanding 
more autonomy and disregarding federal laws and the central authorities were 
incapable of enforcing federal laws." 
The most intense demands and declarations of independence were coming 
from ethnic republics such as Tatarstan, Bahskiria and Chechnya. While in the 
case of Tatarstan and Bahskiria the situation was managed through the negotia­
tion of treaties with the federal government as early as 1993, in the case of 
Chechnya it led to a bloody civil war. A number of natural resource-rich 
regions, for example, Sakha (Yakutia) and Tyumen, demanded special arrange­
ments and treatment on the basis that they had been exploited for their natural 
resources, which had resulted in environmental degradation, and had never 
benefited from their wealth. Less aggressive in their demands, at least at the 
beginning of the transition, were the industrially well endowed and generally 
wealthier regions, but later on these regions joined the chorus of complaining 
regions, in their case arguing about being forced to subsidize poorer regions. 
These different treatments became de jure asymmetric treatment when the 
new 1993 constitution made asymmetric treatment legal and standard. 
Legally, asymmetric arrangements were also formalized in the different char­
ters and constitutions of the regions, and in the case of many republics, their 
national constitutions appeared to be at odds with the constitution of the Rus­
sian Federation (Lynn and Novikov 1997). The regional charters and constitu­
tions used a different definition of the bilateral relationship between the 
regions and the centre, especially in relation to specific arrangements relating 
to revenue and expenditure assignments. 
After some six or seven years of transition, asymmetric federalism was 
being slowly but surely dismantled, a trend that started in the closing years of 
the Yeltsin presidency and accelerated after Putin became president. Indeed, 
one of Putin's first important moves was to cut back the power of regional 
governors, including assigning himself the authority to remove incompliant 
governors from office. This section takes a closer view of how asymmetric 
federalism has evolved in the Russian Federation. Russia's experience may 
Asymmetric Federalism in Russia 249 
provide one of the richest examples of asymmetric federalism, with all the 
advantages and disadvantages that come with it. 
Russia's Path to Asymmetric Fiscal Relations, 1992-93 
In the early years of the Yeltsin presidency (1992-93), pressures to contain and 
mitigate powerful centrifugal forces dominated intergovernmental fiscal rela­
tions. Many regions were attempting to position themselves to benefit as much 
as possible from the political and institutional weaknesses of the centre at this 
stage of the transition. These same regions often flaunted federal laws, and by 
doing so, imposed explicit costs and negative externalities on other regions. 
The federal authorities' desire to find conditions acceptable to troublemaking 
regions inevitably led to different forms of asymmetric fiscal federalism.12 
Regional assertiveness, especially on the part of the ethnic republics, 
reached its peak during 1992-93, when Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet (par­
liament) were involved in a power struggle. Even thought the Federation 
Treaty of March 1992 gave the ethnic republics some additional powers, the 
1993 constitution took these powers away. However, the constitution itself 
opened the door to new forms of asymmetric treatment by virtue of allowing 
bilateral treaties between the federation and regional governments. 
To a large extent, the asymmetric federalism of the early years of the tran­
sition was de facto. The regions ignored or disobeyed federal laws, in particu­
lar, several important laws enacted during the early period of transition, such 
as the 1991 Law on the Foundations of the Tax System in the Russian Federa­
tion (Igudin 1998; Lavrov 1998; Wallich 1994). The ambiguity of the 1993 
constitution about such fundamental questions as the inalienable rights of the 
regions did not help the situation (Teague 1996), and these important issues 
were left to be decided in practice. 
By allowing the federal government to enter into secret bilateral treaties 
with regional governments, the 1993 constitution legalized the practice of 
asymmetric federalism, and this became reality through the allegedly 
favourable treatment given to the ethnic republics of Tatarstan and Bashkor­
tostan in the first two treaties. This fits the view that the federal government 
provided systematically more advantages and privileges to the politically dif­
ficult regions to bribe the regional opposition and tame centrifugal forces. In 
short, Moscow has tended to reward rather than punish defiant regions. As 
Wallich (1994) and others argue, this type of response created an asymmetric 
federalist system starting in 1992 whereby, according to Lavrov (1995), a pat­
tern was established that favoured the 21 ethnic republics over the other 
regions in the form of larger subsidies, permission to retain a higher share of 
tax collection, and special decrees granting economic benefits. While in early 
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1992 just a few regions had stopped or greatly reduced their remittances to the 
federal government, namely, Tatarstan, Chechnya, Sakha (Yakutia) and 
Bashkortostan, by the end of 1992 similar problems had arisen with 20 
regions, and by 1993, this number had increased to 30 regions (Wallich 1994). 
Asymmetric Relations in 1994-97 
The 1993 constitution's formal acceptance of asymmetric relations through 
bilateral treaties—which covered such issues as budgetary relations, state 
property, ownership and use of natural resources and migration—restored 
some predictability and order to the system of intergovernmental fiscal rela­
tions. While confrontations between the federal government and some regions 
continued to test the federation's strength during this period, the nature of 
these confrontations tended to shift from centrifugal tensions towards a com­
petition between the regions for special recognition and favourable fiscal 
arrangements. 
The constitution declared all subjects of the federation equal, although it 
also granted the ethnic republics special rights, such as passing their own con­
stitutions. However, the constitution gave basically the same rights in one 
form or another to all the regions.13 
While the bilateral treaties provided an official acknowledgement of 
regional power, the general pattern of behaviour among the regions became 
less chaotic and threatening to Russia's unity with the notable exception of 
Chechnya. Another sign of the regions' power during this period was the 
regional governments' absolute discretion to organize their relationships with 
their local governments. 
One central feature of the asymmetric treatment of the regions during this 
period was that not all the regions had a bilateral treaty with the federal gov­
ernment. Indeed, other regions' growing resentment against the ethnic 
republics had become apparent and not surprising. In 1995, many other 
regional governments tried and succeeded in getting bilateral treaties with 
Moscow. Although concessions granted to some regions affected bargaining 
with other regions, not all treaties came out the same (Solnick 1995). 
Many observers have concluded that the problems with Russian federalism 
during this time were the manifestation of a weak federal government, the 
absence of cooperation between the centre and the regions and a common 
pool (or 'tragedy of the commons') problem. This is a main theme in Blan-
chard and Shleifer (2000); Lavrov, Litwack and Sutherland (2000); and 
OECD (2000). Blanchard and Shleifer (2000), in particular, emphasize that 
the contrast between the success of China's transition versus the failure of 
Russia's occurred because China was able to retain a strong political centre. 
Mending Russia's fiscal federalism problems required strengthening the 
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political and institutional power of the centre relative to the regions (see also 
the discussion in Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001; Shleifer and Treisman 
2000), and Russia would have to wait until Putin's election as president for a 
significant turnaround in the relationships between the centre and the regions. 
However, the situation may have involved more than a weak centre. For 
example, de Figueiredo, Rui and Weingast (2001) observe that a problem with 
Russian federalism was the lack of appropriately defined limits on the central 
government. They maintain that in some way the federal government was too 
strong, given its ability to change rules pertaining to and extract rents from 
the regions, which detracted from the regions' perceptions of benefits result­
ing from participation in the federal relationship. From this perspective, solv­
ing the problem of noncooperation required not only more power for the 
centre, but simultaneously credible limits on the centre, which had acted and 
could continue to act without self-restraint in the pursuit of its own interests. 
For example, at the start of the transition the federal government dumped 
expenditure responsibilities on the regions without adequate funding and has 
continued to control virtually all tax and regulatory powers, while the regions 
depend on the centre for most of their budget funding and are therefore sub­
ject to the whims of federal authorities. 
Retreat from Special Treatment: Yeltsin 1998-99 
In addition to generating mistrust and resentment among the regions, asym­
metric federalism in general, and the bilateral treaties in particular, had other 
significant costs. One of them was the mounting fiscal pressure on the federal 
budget that became increasingly noticeable during the first six months of 
1998 (see, for example, World Bank 2001). The conflicting budget demands 
at the regional and federal levels and the federal government's inability to col­
lect revenues eventually resulted in a federal deficit as high as 10 per cent of 
gross domestic product. At the same time, both the federal and regional gov­
ernments continued to borrow heavily domestically and abroad. All levels of 
government also proceeded to accumulate payment arrears while becoming 
more frequent users of mutual settlements (noncash offsets) and barter. The 
combination of increased deficits, tight money supply and fixed exchange 
rates led to the August 1998 crisis, with the devaluation and floating of the 
ruble and the federal government's default of most of its domestic debt, which 
in turn precipitated a banking crisis. 
The August 1998 crisis provided the federal government with an opportu­
nity to re-evaluate its policies on many fronts, including its budgetary rela­
tionships with the regions. One of the issues examined was the role the 
bilateral treaties had played in the crisis. This examination showed that the 
special fiscal treatment provisions in the treaties had contributed to the 
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mounting fiscal pressures that eventually led to the crisis. Undoing the dam­
age caused by the bilateral treaties and special deals proved difficult. Never­
theless, the retreat from asymmetric treatment clearly started in the late 
Yeltsin years by the federal government simply not always complying with 
provisions in the treaties. At this time, the federal government also started a 
serious recentralization of fiscal resources (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 
2001). These efforts involved introducing deeper tax reforms that eventually 
included the Tax Code, the Budget Code, the Law on the Financial Founda­
tions of Local Self-Government and the so-called concept of reform of inter­
governmental relations in the Russian Federation for 1999-2001. Another 
law, the Law on the Principles for the Demarcation of Jurisdictions and Pow­
ers, enacted in June 1999, clearly restated the supremacy of the federal consti­
tution, federal legislation and federal decrees over regional constitutions, 
legislation and decrees. One clear feature of all these documents was the new 
willingness of the federal government to intervene in fiscal arrangements 
between regional governments and their local governments. 
The Putin Era: 2000-02 
Putin came to power in March 2000 with what now seems a clear mandate to 
control the regional governments and re-assert the role of the federal authori­
ties. For example, in May 2000, the Chief Prosecutor's Office declared that 60 
regions had local laws, including regional charters or constitutions, that seri­
ously contradicted federal laws, and in June 2000, Putin's appointed chief pros­
ecutor gave the regions one month to synchronize their laws with federal laws. 
This was just the beginning. Following his election, Putin took a number 
of steps to strengthen the federal position in relation to the regional govern­
ments. In May 2000, he issued a decree that divided Russia into seven groups 
of regions (the federal districts), each with a presidential envoy (or plenipo­
tentiary) to monitor regional legislation and ensure that regional administra­
tions were abiding by federal laws. Furthermore, the State Duma (or lower 
house of parliament) approved legislation that gave the Russian president the 
power to suspend regional legislation that conflicted with federal law, as well 
as the power to dismiss regional governors if their actions were judged to be 
in violation of federal statutes. The makeup of the Federation Council, the 
upper chamber of parliament, was redone by replacing the governors with 
regional representatives elected by the regional legislatures. In the past, as 
members of the Federation Council the regional governors had often played 
an obstructionist role. These legal changes gave the federal authorities effec­
tive instruments to deal with even the most recalcitrant regions, excluding 
Chechnya. The best evidence that the federal government has regained much 
authority is that Tatarstan is adopting amendments to its constitution to bring 
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it closer in line with the Russian constitution and other legislation (East West 
Institute 2002a). Nevertheless, some regions are resisting, for example, 
Bashkortostan is holding on to its declaration of sovereignty and President 
Murtaza Rakhimov has run for office a third time on his sovereignty platform 
(East West Institute 2002b). 
Putin's administration continued the recentralization of revenues that had 
started in the late years of the Yeltsin administration. Following his election to 
the presidency, Putin managed to get four chapters of the second part of the 
Tax Code approved by the State Duma, which had a profound impact on 
regional finances. Subnational government turnover taxes, which provided a 
substantial level of own source revenues for local and regional governments, 
were substantially reduced and are scheduled to be eliminated, and the over­
haul of the personal income tax also reduced subnational revenues. 
HOW WELL DID ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM WORK? 
Given the significant differences among Russia's regions, including different 
demands for fiscal and political autonomy, and the extremely weak institu­
tions at the federal level, allowing asymmetric decentralization was the right 
thing to do. But what is interesting about Russia's experience with asymmet­
ric federalism is that its practice was not at first a voluntary or conscious pol­
icy choice by the federal authorities. Instead, as noted earlier, asymmetric 
policies were forced onto the federal government by the unilateral actions of 
some regional governments. After a while, asymmetric federalism was for­
mally adopted in the constitution approved in 1993 as an explicit and deliber­
ate policy of the federal government. In recent years, the trend has been 
reversed, with deliberate efforts made to eliminate the most important mani­
festations of asymmetric federalism. 
The difficult question is whether asymmetric federalism was a cure for 
national frailties or a poison of the national body politic. The answer is that it 
was probably both a cure and a poison at different times during the transition. 
Initially, the asymmetric treatment of regions served to stem the enormous 
centrifugal forces in operation at the start of the transition. The positive 
results occurred at a time when federal institutions were weak and unable to 
enforce its national laws (Solnick 1995). Its fear of being unable to enforce 
legislation may have caused the federal government to consider bilateral 
negotiations as a solution. Thus Moscow's strategy of buying consent from 
the regions was largely imposed by circumstances and was the only demo­
cratic way out. Prior to the introduction of the bilateral treaties, Moscow was 
having a hard time holding the country together. Separatist threats and resis­
tance to federal policies by a group of regional governments were constant. 
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The bilateral treaties had the strategic effect of weakening any coordinated 
action and demands by the ethnic republics that had been most antagonistic to 
Moscow. The treaties are also widely acknowledged as having prevented the 
secession of some of those ethnic republics, such as Tatarstan.14 
The net impact of asymmetric federalism in the first half of the transition 
decade was probably to rein in the powerful centrifugal forces that existed in 
Russia at that time.15 Naturally, we cannot know how things would have 
developed if different decisions at been made at the time. For example, the 
conflict in Chechnya undoubtedly had a profound impact on the scope and 
depth of other regions' demands. Thus the moderating effects of asymmetric 
federalism may have resulted from how Moscow handled the Chechnya con­
flict. From early on, many in Moscow appeared to view the conflict in Chech­
nya as the line in the sand for the future viability of the Russian Federation. 
The supporters of armed intervention emphasized the need to bring the seces­
sionist leadership to heel to prevent the break-up of the entire country 
(Lapidus 1999). 
However, what had been a solution to a serious problem soon turned into a 
serious problem itself. Asymmetric treatment of what were supposed to be 
equal subjects of the federation rapidly gave rise to resentment, lack of soli­
darity and noncooperative behaviour by the regions, leading to a situation 
akin to the tragedy of the commons. A weakened federal government was 
unable to stop this process. By 1995-96, asymmetric federalism was increas­
ingly poisoning the national fabric. Because of asymmetric federalism, almost 
all the regions had an incentive to deviate from cooperative behaviour and 
press for special treatment with the federal authorities or try to take matters 
into their own hands, such as illegally retaining federal revenues (see Eckardt 
2002 for a discussion of some of these issues). For many observers, large and 
sustained federal budget deficits, the federal government's inability to impose 
fiscal discipline and the financial crisis of 1998 were all associated with the 
form of fiscal federalism practiced. The privileged treatment of some regions 
was an important flaw in Russia's federalism that had to be changed as dispar­
ities grew in terms of the quality and quantity of public services (Martinez-
Vazquez and Boex 2001). In this respect, the dilemma the government faced 
is familiar to any country trying to develop its regions in a balanced way. 
Maintaining living standards in all regions may actually retard overall eco­
nomic development. Perhaps a more important manifestation of the system's 
inadequate performance was the extensive failure to harmonize regional and 
national interests: a number of regions and their governors appeared to be 
willing to inflict high costs on the rest of the country for minimal gains to 
themselves. 
Not long after the crisis of August 1998, consensus arose about the need to 
retreat from the asymmetric treatment of the regions and to rein in regional 
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governors. Even though the federal government tried to do this in the later 
years of the Yeltsin administration, it did not happen until Putin's election as 
president. 
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 
Russia's system of fiscal federalism will continue to evolve in the future. The 
Russian Federation is still a young country, as reflected by its system of fiscal 
decentralization. Of course, international trends affect Russia as much as they 
do other countries, and one of these trends is globalization. As some regions 
increase their commercial links with other parts of the world, the value of the 
domestic market and other common domestic institutions may be diminished 
for these regions, resulting in more centrifugal pressures, especially in the far-
flung areas such as the Far East, the North Caucasian and the Northwest 
areas, although for the present the main beneficiaries of globalization have 
been the city and oblast of Moscow, neither of which are likely to adopt a sep­
aratist agenda. At the same time, international trade increases the federal gov­
ernment's leverage through its control of customs, pipelines, railroads and so 
on. Thus, for example, shipments of oil from landlocked Tatarstan are entirely 
in the hands of the federal authorities. In the past, Moscow has refused to 
issue import-export licenses to companies headquartered in troubled regions 
or threatened to close oil pipelines. 
On the domestic front, several important issues will take centre stage in the 
immediate future. Flow the federal government addresses these issues will 
define Russia's fiscal federalism in the decades to come. The first issue is 
asymmetric federalism and the status of the bilateral treaties. After several 
years of Putin's administration, as noted earlier, the need for asymmetric fed­
eralism has been put into question. When running for president in early 2000, 
Putin was clear about his intentions to restore and strengthen the authority of 
the federal government over the regions. He has kept this election promise. 
Most regions have ceased to act from a 'what can we get' perspective and 
have begun to ask 'what can we keep' from the concessions won during the 
past seven or eight years. Thus the regional mavericks are in retreat, but they 
are far from defeated. In relation to the bilateral treaties, the official view in 
Moscow during the Putin administration years has been that they are an 
important impediment to the rationalization and reform of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations. While some regional governors renounced their bilateral 
treaties with Moscow soon after Putin had made his opposition to them pub­
lic, others adamantly refused to give them up. Not surprisingly, ethnic and 
richer regions have been more likely to try to keep their treaties with Moscow 
in place. In his annual address to the State Duma in April 2002. Putin reiterated 
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his position that the bilateral treaties signed 'behind the backs' of the other 
regions have outlived their usefulness. He also made the point that if any of 
these treaties remain in place, they should be approved by the State Duma so 
that 'everyone knows who has what preferences and why'. 
The second issue is the growing fiscal disparity and whether national soli­
darity can address this. Economic disparities will probably continue to 
increase, because of the sites selected for domestic and foreign investment 
and because of the concentration of natural resources. In turn, pressure on the 
federal budget to redress the imbalances will also increase. Inevitably, regard­
less of the form the equalization system takes, the additional resources will 
have to come from the better-off regions. The question is how much tolerance 
these regions will exhibit towards poorer regions, which in some cases the 
richer regions may perceive as inefficient or corrupt. Without support from 
the richer regions, it will become harder for the federal government to under­
take effective equalization, but growing disparities and concentrations of 
poverty will pose political risks, especially at the periphery of the country. 
Putin's popularity and his ability to maintain good relations with the regions 
and the State Duma may stave off these tendencies for some time, but the 
underlying problems are unlikely to dissipate and could flare up. 
The third issue is whether the federal government will intervene any fur­
ther in the restructuring of the relationships between regional and local gov­
ernments. The current administration continues to stress its strong support for 
local governments, and the federal government has worked on several propos­
als to provide separate assignments at the local level. How these will translate 
into concrete legislation on fiscal issues, such as separate revenue and expen­
diture assignments or mandated formula transfers, remains to be seen. Of 
course, if approved such changes would weaken the grip of regional govern­
ments and governors over local governments. 
The fourth issue is whether the federal government will push for adminis­
trative and political reform in the regions. Consolidation of the regions into 
fewer regions, which would not only reduce administrative costs, but could 
also help address the need for asymmetric arrangements and for fiscal equal­
ization, is an issue that has been discussed for some time. In particular, a 
series of proposals originating with the State Duma suggest either allowing 
regions to merge on a voluntary basis or forcing them to merge. The most 
repeated proposal is the elimination of the ten AOs and one autonomous 
oblast and their assimilation by the surrounding oblasts and krays. Many have 
interpreted Putin's recent creation of the seven federal districts headed by 
directly appointed plenipotentiaries as the first step towards regional consoli­
dation. However, even more recently, Putin has made it clear that he does not 
want the federal districts to develop into quasi states or quasi republics. Thus 
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far, the federal districts have been used to de-concentrate federal power and 
exercise more active and effective supervision of the regions' actions. 
An important recent development in relation to fiscal federalism was 
Putin's appointment of a high-level commission in 2001, known as the Kozak 
Commission, to redefine and reform intergovernmental fiscal relations. The 
commission issued recommendations in September 2002, but Putin decided to 
send the recommendations to the State Council, a consultative body, for fur­
ther consideration before sending any bills to parliament. These recommenda­
tions include the need to adequately fund each level of government according 
to its assigned expenditure responsibilities, which may be interpreted as more 
money and tax autonomy for subnational governments. The increase in rev­
enue autonomy will not negate the need for transfers, because only a tiny 
minority of Russia's 13 000 local governments have enough money to meet or 
exceed their present expenses with their current revenue assignments). 
One of the most divisive issues is the reassignment of revenues from taxes 
from natural resources. The Kozak Commission report appears to argue that 
these revenues should be recentralized and then redistributed more fairly 
among the regions. Furthermore, the commission recommends abandoning 
the so-called two key practice, whereby both federal and regional govern­
ments must provide licenses for the exploitation of natural resources, for full 
and exclusive federal control. Naturally the natural resource-rich regions are 
completely opposed to this suggestion. 
Russia has made a remarkable journey over the past decade. It has returned 
from the brink of disintegration and chaos to become a young, but still fragile, 
democracy. The challenge for the future remains, however, to find the appro­
priate balance between the rights of the regions, including respect for and 
acceptance of their diversity, and a federal government capable of enforcing 
the law and protecting and defending common national interests. Whether this 
balance can be maintained in the future without the asymmetric treatment of 
the regions and with respect for basic democratic principles remains to be seen. 
Appendix: Key features of regions, selected years 
Population GRP 
Area, Population, density, GRP, per capita, 
2000 2000 2000 1998 1998 Percent­ Percent­ Percent 
(thousands (thousands (people (Rub (Rub age of age of age of 
Name of area of km2) of people) per km2) thousands) thousands) area population GDP 
Northern Area 1466.3 5668 3.9 110 383 19.1 8.59 3.88 4.59 
Karelia 172.4 766 4.4 11 306 14.6 1.01 0.52 0.47 
Komi 415.9 1135 2.7 28 350 24.4 2.44 0.78 1.18 
Arkhangel oblast 410.7 1414 3.4 22 763 15.3 2.41 0.97 0.95 
Nenetsky AO 176.7 46 0.3 — — 1.03 0.03 — 
Vologot oblast 145.7 1324 9.1 24 118 18.0 0.85 0.91 1.00 
Murmansk oblast 144.9 983 6.8 23 847 23.4 0.85 0.67 0.99 
Northwestern Area 197.1 7898 40.1 126 866 15.9 1.15 5.41 5.28 
St Petersburg 0.6 4694 7823.3 89 781 18.9 0.00 3.22 3.74 
Leningrad oblast 85.9 1674 19.5 21 171 12.6 0.50 1.15 0.88 
Novgorod 55.3 729 13.2 9402 12.7 0.32 0.50 0.39 
Pskov 55.3 801 14.5 6512 7.9 0.32 0.55 0.27 
Central Area 484.0 29 361 60.7 615 670 20.8 2.83 20.12 25.63 
Bryan oblast 34.9 1443 41.3 11 884 8.1 0.20 0.99 0.49 
Vladimir oblast 29.0 1609 55.5 15 995 9.8 0.17 1.10 0.67 
Ivanov oblast 21.8 1222 56.1 9050 7.3 0.13 0.84 0.38 
Kaluzh oblast 29.9 1081 
Kostroma oblast 60.1 786 
Moscow 1.0 8631 
Moscow oblast 47.0 6511 
Orlov oblast 24.7 899 
Ryazan oblast 39.6 1284 
Smolensk oblast 49.8 1133 
Tver 84.1 1602 
Tul oblast 25.7 1746 
Yaroslav oblast 36.4 1414 
Volgo- Vyatsk A rea 265.4 8292 
Mariy El 23.2 759 
Mordoviya 26.2 929 
Chuvashiya 18.3 1357 
Kirov oblast 120.8 1589 
Nizhegorod 76.9 3658 
Central Chernozem Area 167.7 7781 
Belgorod 27.1 1497 
Voronezh 52.4 2459 
Kursk 29.8 1316 
Lipetsk 24.1 1240 
Tambov 34.3 1269 
36.2 10916 10.0 0.18 0.74 0.45 
13.1 8882 11.1 0.35 0.54 0.37 
8631.0 362 520 42.0 0.01 5.91 15.09 
138.5 100 612 15.3 0.28 4.46 4.19 
36.4 10 246 11.3 0.14 0.62 0.43 
32.4 14 186 10.9 0.23 0.88 0.59 
22.8 12 234 10.6 0.29 0.78 0.51 
19.0 17 747 10.9 0.49 1.10 0.74 
67.9 19 051 10.7 0.15 1.20 0.79 
38.8 22 348 15.6 0.21 0.97 0.93 
31.2 97 686 11.7 1.55 5.68 4.07 
32.7 6568 8.6 0.14 0.52 0.27 
35.5 9323 9.9 0.15 0.64 0.39 
74.2 12 123 8.9 0.11 0.93 0.50 
13.2 16 931 10.5 0.71 1.09 0.70 
47.6 52 741 14.3 0.45 2.51 2.20 
46.4 87 858 11.2 0.98 5.33 3.66 
55.2 19 609 13.2 0.16 1.03 0.82 
46.9 23 907 9.6 0.31 1.69 1.00 
44.2 16 827 12.6 0.17 0.90 0.70 
51.5 17 043 13.7 0.14 0.85 0.71 
37.0 10 472 8.1 0.20 0.87 0.44 
Appendix (continued) 
Area, 
2000 
(thousands 
Name of area of km2) 
Povolzhsk Area 536.4 
Kalmykiya 76.1 
Tatarstan 68.0 
Astrakhan 44.1 
Volgograd 113.9 
Penza 43.2 
Samara 53.6 
Saratov 100.2 
Ulyanov oblast 37.3 
North Caucasian Area 374.4 
Adygeya 7.6 
Dagestan 50.3 
Ingushetiya 19.3 
Chechnya 12.5 
Kabardino-B alkar 14.1 
Karachaevo-Cherkes 8.0 
Alaniya 19.3 
Population GRP 
Population, density, GRP, per capita, 
2000 2000 1998 1998 Percent­ Percent­ Percent 
(thousands (people (Rub (Rub age of age of age of 
of people) per km2) thousands) thousands) area population GDP 
16 805 31.3 240 021 14.2 3.14 11.52 9.99 
316 4.2 1704 5.4 0.45 0.22 0.07 
3779 55.6 67 700 17.9 0.40 2.59 2.82 
1024 23.2 10 773 10.5 0.26 0.70 0.45 
2678 23.5 30 907 11.4 0.67 1.84 1.29 
1531 35.4 11 131 7.2 0.25 1.05 0.46 
3297 61.5 72 662 22.0 0.31 2.26 3.02 
2712 27.1 28 663 10.5 0.59 1.86 1.19 
1468 39.4 16 482 11.1 0.22 1.01 0.69 
17 677 47.2 148 653 8.4 2.19 12.11 6.19 
449 59.1 3384 7.5 0.04 0.31 0.14 
2149 42.7 8652 4.1 0.29 1.47 0.36 
488 25.3 1053 3.4 0.11 0.33 0.04 
574 45.9 — — 0.07 0.39 — 
792 56.2 6361 8.0 0.08 0.54 0.26 
435 54.4 2854 6.5 0.05 0.30 0.12 
674 34.9 4142 6.2 0.11 0.46 0.17 
Krasnodar 76.0 5067 
Stavropol 66.5 2691 
Rostov 100.8 4358 
Ural Area 824.0 20 321 
Bashkortostan 143.6 4117 
Udmurtiya 42.1 1633 
Kurgan 71.0 1097 
Orenburg 124.0 2224 
Perm 127.7 2814 
Komi-Permyatsky AO 32.9 152 
Sverdlov 194.8 4612 
Chelyabinsk 87.9 3672 
West Siberia Area 2427.2 15 040 
Altay 92.6 205 
Altaysky Kray 169.1 2653 
Kemerovskaya oblast 95.5 2987 
Novosibirk oblast 178.2 2744 
Omsk oblast 139.7 2163 
Tomsk 316.9 1067 
Tyumen 161.8 1358 
Khanty-Mansiysky AO 523.1 1368 
Yamalo Nenetsky AO 750.3 495 
66.7 53 732 10.6 0.45 3.47 2.24 
40.5 28 591 10.7 0.39 1.84 1.19 
43.2 39 886 9.1 0.59 2.99 1.66 
24.7 306 038 15.0 4.83 13.93 12.74 
28.7 64 191 15.6 0.84 2.82 2.67 
38.8 20 014 12.2 0.25 1.12 0.83 
15.5 9684 8.8 0.42 0.75 0.40 
17.9 28 770 12.9 0.73 1.52 1.20 
22.0 55 594 18.6 0.75 1.93 2.31 
4.6 — — 0.19 0.10 — 
23.7 80 675 17.3 1.14 3.16 3.36 
41.8 47 110 12.8 0.51 2.52 1.96 
6.2 356 823 23.6 14.21 10.31 14.85 
2.2 1634 8.1 0.54 0.14 0.07 
15.7 22 411 8.4 0.99 1.82 0.93 
31.3 45 644 15.1 0.56 2.05 1.90 
15.4 35 231 12.8 1.04 1.88 1.47 
15.5 29 466 13.5 0.82 1.48 1.23 
3.4 21 232 19.8 1.86 0.73 0.88 
8.4 201 206 62.7 0.95 0.93 8.38 
2.6 — — 3.06 0.94 — 
0.7 — — 4.39 0.34 — 
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Population GRP 
Area, Population, density, GRP. per capita, 
2000 2000 2000 1998 1998 Percent­ Percent­ Percent 
(thousands (thousands (people (Rub (Rub age of age of age of 
Name of area of km2) of people) per km2) thousands) thousands) area population GDP 
East Siberia Area 4122.8 8973 2.2 158 566 17.5 24.14 6.15 6.60 
Buryatiya 351.3 1035 2.9 11 167 10.7 2.06 0.71 0.46 
Tuva 170.5 311 1.8 1847 6.0 1.00 0.21 0.08 
Khakassiya 61.9 581 9.4 8192 14.0 0.36 0.40 0.34 
Krasnoyarsk kray 710.0 2978 4.2 71 548 23.2 4.16 2.04 2.98 
Taimyrsk AO 862.1 43 0.0 — — 5.05 0.03 — 
Evenkiysk AO 767.6 18 0.0 — — 4.50 0.01 — 
Irkutsk Oblast 745.5 2604 3.5 52 620 19.0 4.37 1.78 2.19 
Byryatsk AO 22.4 144 6.4 — — 0.13 0.10 — 
Chitinsk oblast 412.5 1180 2.9 13 191 10.3 2.42 0.81 0.55 
Aginsky AO 19.0 79 4.2 — — 0.11 0.05 — 
Far Eastern Area 6231.0 7160 1.1 153 717 21.0 36.49 4.91 6.40 
Sakha 3103.2 977 0.3 33 375 33.3 18.17 0.67 1.39 
Evreyskaya AO 36.0 199 5.5 1832 8.9 0.21 0.14 0.08 
Chukotsk AO 737.7 72 0.1 2593 32.0 4.32 0.05 0.11 
Primorsk kray 165.9 2174 13.1 31 473 14.2 0.97 1.49 1.31 
Khabarovsk kray 788.6 1518 1.9 30 073 19.5 4.62 1.04 1.25 
Amursk oblast 363.7 1006 2.8 14 739 14.4 2.13 0.69 0.61 
Kamchatska oblast 170.8 354 
Koryaksk AO 301.5 29 
Magadan oblast 461.4 233 
Sakhalin oblast 87.1 598 
Kaliningrad oblast 15.1 949 
Russian Federation 17 075.4 145 925 
Maximum 3103.2 8631 
Minimum 0.6 18 
— Not available. 
AO Autonomous okrug. 
GDP Gross domestic product. 
GRP Gross regional product. 
Source: Goskomstat data. 
2.1 11 136 28.1 1.00 0.24 0.46 
0.1 — — 1.77 0.02 — 
0.5 6735 27.4 2.70 0.16 0.28 
6.9 13 100 21.1 0.51 0.41 0.55 
62.8 8659 9.2 0.09 0.65 0.36 
8.5 2 402 280 16.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 
8631.0 362 520 62.7 18.17 5.91 15.09 
0.0 1053 3.4 0.00 0.01 0.04 
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NOTES 
1. Oblast is a name for the subnational entity in several Slavic languages. The word kray 
(which also means border or end), is used for regions located along the economic and geo­
graphic periphery. Okrug is a Slavic adaptation or translation from German kreis, a term 
that denotes administrative subdivision. The autonomous okrugs are administered as sepa­
rate parts of the oblasts and krays, but for reporting and statistical purposes, the autonomous 
okrugs are often incorporated into the surrounding oblast or kray. 
2. In June 2001, the federal government and the World Bank agreed to a loan of US$80 mil­
lion to resettle inhabitants of the far north to reduce the needs for public support. Helping 
the same families in other parts of Russia with more moderate climates and better access to 
public services is definitely cheaper than helping them if they remain in the far north. 
3. In Soviet times, the authorities enforced restrictions on internal mobility by issuing resi­
dency permits and internal passports. 
4. There is, of course, rich history to accompany each ethnic republic and AO. For example, 
Tatarstan, one of the most colourful and assertive ethnic regions, has been part of Russia since 
1552, when Czar Ivan the Terrible entered Kazan, the capital, defeating the khanate of Kazan. 
5. The red belt consists of those predominantly agricultural and nonurban regions that consis­
tently voted for the Communist Party during the transition. Berkowitz and DeJong (1998) 
find evidence of virtual internal borders in these regions, explained by their protective and 
centrally controlled economic policies. 
6. Unlike the enterprise profit tax, which is a federal tax shared with subnational governments, 
the sales tax and the enterprise assets tax are 100 per cent local taxes (and therefore not 
shown in Table 8.7). The federal government eliminated the (local) sales tax in 2004. 
7. Remember that tax sharing is not considered to be part of the equalization transfers. 
8. Note that differences in findings may reflect the use of different definitions of transfers. For ex­
ample, Popov (2002) uses a more comprehensive definition of transfers than Treisman (1996). 
9. Some multinational democracies assign different legal, linguistic and cultural competencies 
to their regions, for instance, Belgium, Canada, India, Russia and Spain. 
10. In the case of transfers, even under perfectly symmetric federalism, regions will receive dif­
ferent amounts, reflecting differences in need, capacity and so on. Transfers are a complex, 
grey area in terms of asymmetric federalism. Formula-driven and objective procedures to 
determine transfers may be considered symmetrical treatment ex ante; however, in many 
countries equalization formulas have been reshaped and twisted to accommodate the inter­
ests of particular regions. 
11. McLure, Wallich and Litvack (1996) report that by mid-1992, some 20 regions had unilater­
ally declared that they alone would decide what portion of taxes their regions would share 
with the federal government, the so called single channel arrangement, and by mid-1993 
some 30 regions had done so. Naturally these sharing rates were lower than those the Min­
istry of Finance had in mind. 
12. To some extent, asymmetric federalism was also practiced in the Soviet Union, because 
subnational budgets were customized on the basis of negotiated expenditure norms, regu­
lated revenue sharing rates and negotiated transfers. 
13. In particular, article 77 of the constitution establishes that the regions will determine their 
system of government, but must follow federal principles of legislative and executive pow­
ers, which requires direct election of the head of government, something that many of the 
ethnic republics were already doing. In 2004, President Putin announced plans to return to 
the old system of having heads of regional governments appointed from the centre. 
14. According to an article in the New York Times (9 March 2000), long-standing Tatarstan 
President Mintimer Shaimiyev maintains that the push towards sovereignty, and even the 
flaunting of the Russian constitution in the first years of the transition, defused Tatarstan's 
seething nationalist sentiment. That produced much better results than Chechnya's attempt 
to break away by means of armed resistance. See also the discussions in Freinkman and 
Haney (1997) and Treisman (1996). 
15. However, not everyone agrees on the effectiveness of the asymmetric federalism as prac­
ticed. In the view of Ordeshook (1995) and Polishchuk (1996), the political system failed to 
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accommodate the regions' diverse economic and political interests, which during the Yeltsin 
years led to more political conflict and economic instability than was necessary. 
REFERENCES 
The word 'processed' describes informally reproduced works that may not be com­
monly available in libraries. 
Ahrend, Rudiger (2000), 'Speed of Reform, Initial Conditions, Political Orientation, 
or What? Explaining Russian Regions' Economic Performance', Working Paper 
no. 2, Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy, Moscow. 
Berkowitz, Daniel and David N. DeJong (1998), 'Russia's Internal Borders', Univer­
sity of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, processed. 
Blanchard, Olivier and Andrei Shleifer (2000), 'Federalism With and Without Political 
Centralization: China Versus Russia', Working Paper. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
Broadman, Harry G. and Francesca Recanatini (2001), 'Where Has All the Foreign 
Investment Gone in Russia?' World Bank, Washington, DC, processed. 
de Figueiredo, Rui J. P. and Barry R. Weingast (2001), 'Constructing Self-Enforcing 
Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia,' Stanford University, 
Palo Alto, CA, processed. 
de Melo, Martha, Gur Ofer and Plamen Yossifov (1999), 'Transition in Regional Capi­
tals Along the Volga', Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 40 (8), 553-616. 
Eckardt, Sebastian (2002), 'Russia's Market Distorting Federalism: Decentralization, 
Governance, and Economic Performance in Russia in the 90s', Working Paper No. 
42, Eastern Europe Institute of the Free University of Berlin, Berlin. 
East West Institute (2002a), Russian Regional Report, 7 (7). 
(2002b), Russian Regional Report, 7 (12) 7. 
Freinkman, Lev and Michael Haney (1997), 'What Affects the Russian Regional Gov­
ernments' Propensity to Subsidize?' Policy Research Working Paper No. 1818, 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Heleniak, Timothy (1997), 'Internal Migration in Russia During the Economic Transi­
tion', Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 38 (2), 81-104. 
Igudin, Albert G. (1998), 'Analysis and Assessment of the Existing System of Inter­
governmental Fiscal Relations in the Russian Federation', Ministry of Finance of 
the Russian Federation, Research Institute of Finance, Moscow. 
Kurlyandskaya, Galina (2001), 'Budgetary Pluralism of Russian Authorities', Discus­
sion Paper no. 17, Open Society Institute, Local Government and Public Service 
Reform Initiative, Budapest. 
Lapidus, Gail W. (1998), 'Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya', Interna­
tional Security, 2 (Summer), 5-45. 
(1999), 'Asymmetrical Federalism and State Breakdown in Russia', Post-
Soviet Affairs, 15 (1), 74-82. 
Lavrov, Alexei (1995), 'Russian Federation: First Steps, First Results', Segodnya, in 
Russian. 
(1998), 'Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Russia: An Agenda for Reform', 
processed. 
Lavrov, Aleksei, John M. Litwack and Douglas Sutherland (2000), 'Fiscal Federalist 
Relations in Russia: A Case for Subnational Autonomy', Working Paper, Organisa­
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
266 Countries in Transition 
Lynn, Nicholas J. and Alexei V. Novikov (1997), 'Refederalizing Russia: Debates on the 
Idea of Federalism in Russia', Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 27 (2), 187-203. 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Jameson Boex (2001), Russia's Transition to a New Feder­
alism, World Bank Institute Learning Series, Washington, DC: World Bank Institute. 
McAuley, A. (1997), 'The Determinants of Russian Federal-Regional Fiscal Relations: 
Equity or Political Influence?' Europe-Asia Studies, 49 (3), 431-44. 
McLure, Charles E., Jr., Christine I. Wallich and Jennie I. Litvack (1996), 'Special 
Issues in Russian Federal Finance: Ethnic Separatism and Natural Resources', in 
Richard Bird, Robert Ebel and Christine Wallich (eds), Decentralization of the 
Socialist State, Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 379-404. 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2000), Eco­
nomic Surveys: The Russian Federation, Paris. 
Ordeshook, Peter O. (1995), 'Re-examining Russia: Institutions and Incentives', Jour­
nal of Democracy, (April), 46-61. 
Polishchuck, Leonid (1996), 'Russian Federalism: Economic Reform and Political 
Behavior', Social Science Working Paper no. 972, California Institute of Technol­
ogy, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, California. 
(2000), 'Legal Initiatives in Russian Regions: Determinants and Effects', Uni­
versity of Maryland, Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, Col­
lege Park, MD, processed. 
Popov, Vladimir (2002), 'Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Rules Versus Electoral Polities', 
Carleton University, Institute of European and Russian Studies, Carleton, Canada, 
processed. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Daniel Treisman (2000), Without a Map: Political Tactics and 
Economic Reform in Russia, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Solanko, Laura (1999), 'Regional Budgets and Intergovernmental Transfers in Russian 
North and Northwest Regions', Working Paper No. 99-6, Bank of Finland, Institute 
for Economies in Transition, Helsinki. 
Solnick, Steven L. (1995), 'Federal Bargaining in Russia', East European Constitu­
tional Review, 4 (4), 52-58. 
Stepan, Alfred (1999), 'Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model', Journal 
of Democracy, 10 (4), 19-34. 
Stewart, Kitty (1996), 'Are Intergovernmental Finances in Russia Equalizing?' Euro­
pean University Institute, Department of Economics, Working Paper ECO No. 
97/22, Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico (FI), Italy. 
Sutherland, Douglas and Philip Hanson (1996), 'Structural Change in the Economies 
of Russia's Regions', Europe-Asia Studies, 48 (3), 367-92. 
Speckhard, C. (1998), 'The Political Economy of Institutional Asymmetry in the Rus­
sian Federation, 1990-1998', University of Texas, Austin, processed. 
Teague, Elizabeth (1996), 'Russia and the Regions: The Uses of Ambiguity', in John 
Gibson and Philip Hanson (eds), Transformation from Below: Local Power and the 
Political Economy of Post-Communist Transition, Cheltenham, UK and Brookfield, 
USA: Edward Elgar. 
Treisman, Daniel (1996), 'The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet 
Russia', British Journal of Political Science, 26 (3), 299-335. 
(2000), After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Rus­
sia, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Wallich, Christine (1994), Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism, Washing­
ton, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (1996), Fiscal Management in Russia, Washington, DC. 
(2001), 'Russian Federation Fiscal Federalism and Regional Fiscal Reform 
Loan', Washington, DC, processed. 
